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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
of intelligently pleading guilty. Bute v. Illinois, supra; (f) where the issues were
not so complex and the defendant was of ordinary intelligence, capable of caring
for his own interests. Betts v. Brady, supra.
Elements which the Court has examined carefully and relied on in finding
whether absence of counsel permitted an unfair trial can be categorized as follows:
(1) the gravity of the crime, (2) the age and education of the defendant, (3)
the conduct of the court or prosecuting officials and (4) the complicated nature
of the charge and its possible defenses. In the instant case, the crime was one of
gravity as is illustrated by a sentence of thirty years imprisonment; petitioner was
a youth of twenty-one when convicted; the prosecution used deception by inform-
ing the defendant that he was pleading guilty to breaking and entering and not to
robbery, and the differences between breaking and entering and robbery are not
easily understood by even the average layman. See Rice'v. Olson, 324 U. S. 786
(1945). These facts show sufficient "special circumstances" to require that the
defendant be assisted by counsel or at least informed of his rights to such assistance.
The additional fact of the defendant's general mental deficiency adds considerable
weight to the Court's decision that the petitioner has been denied his liberty
without due process of law.
Richard M. English
LIFE INSURANCE-PASSAGE OF PROPERTY UNDER NEW OPTION
HELD VIOLATIVE OF STATUTE OF WILLS
In 1925, the defendant company issued a life insurance policy to Arthur
Corlies, who died in 1941. The proceeds of the policy were payable to his daughter
Barbara. She elected the interest-option, (under vhich the insurer retained the
funds, paying a guaranteed rate of interest to the beneficiary, who had the right
to make withdrawals from the principal sum at any time, and in any amount).
Instead of the annual interest payments as prescribed in the 1925 form, Barbara
desired quarterly interest payments in accordance with the current practice. At
this time, plaintiff was the husband of Barbara, and was named contingent payee
under the "supplementary policy of insurance" issued by the company in compliance
with the beneficiary's request; plaintiff to take any amount of the principal sum
remaining at Barbara's death. Barbara and the plaintiff were subsequently
divorced, and Barbara remarried. Upon Barbara's death, plaintiff brought an
action for the proceeds of the policy. Decedent's executors, who were impleaded
by the defendant, moved for a dismissal of plaintiff's complaint, and for a summary
judgment. In granting impleaded defendant's motion, the Court held that the
beneficiary's request for quarterly, instead of annual interest payments constituted
a counter-offer, which defendant's acceptance ripened into a new contract uncon-
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nected with the original policy of insurance. The new contract no longer being
one of insurance, the plaintiff was not entitled to the proceeds, because the new
agreement amounted to an attempted testamentary disposition, invalid as not
complying with the requirements of §21 of the Decedent Estate Law. Hall v.
Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York. et al., - Misc.- , 109 N. Y. S. 2d
646 (Co. Ct. 1952).
Many attempts have been made to devise an acceptable substitute for a will,
and thus circumvent the necessity for probate and administration, with the expenses
and taxes incident thereto. See 82 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 384 (1934). Placing the
property to be disposed of in trust has long been established as one such method,
In re Totten, 179 N. Y. 112, 71 N. E. 748 (1904), and for this reason, much argu-
ment has been advanced that in this situation, the insurer and beneficiary stand as
trustee and cestui que trust. Robbins, Vested Interest of a Beneficiary Under a Pol-
icy of Life Insurance, 53 Cent. L J. 184 (1901). See also, Deferred Settlements in
Life Insurance: "Trusts" or "Debts," 36 Yale L. J. 394, 396 (1926). However, since
the insurance company does not segregate a particular fund for a particular bene-
ficiary, the situation lacks the essential element of a valid trust-an identifiable
trust res. Gough v. Satterlee, 32 App. Div. 33, 52 N. Y. Supp. 492, 497 (2d Dept.
1898). 1 Bogert, Trusts And Trustees, §111 (rev. ed. 1951). Thus in New York
the resultant relationship has been settled to be one of debtor-creditor, and not
trustee-cestui que trust. Noyes v. First Nat'l. Bank of N. Y., 180 App Div. 162,
167 N. Y. Supp. 288 (1st Dept. 1917), aff'd. 224 N. Y. 542, 120 N. E. 870
(1918). Erb v. Banco Di Napoli, 243 N. Y. 45, 152 N. E. 460 (1926). See
also, Restatement, Trusts §12(h) (1935); 1948 Supp., §12 (gg). 1 Scott,
Trusts, pp. 87, 93, 94 (1939).
Passage of property via life insurance policies has also been held to constitute
a proper non-testamentary disposition,'since, as in a valid trust, a (contractual)
right is vested in the recipient inter vivos. Atkinson, Wills, pp. 124-6 (1937).
Given a similar inter vivos divestment by the donor, contracts though not identi-
fiable with ones of insurance have been upheld as valid 'substitutes for wills.
Atkinson, supra, p. 150. The test as to whether the instrument is a valid contract
or an attempted testamentary disposition lies in ah examination of the donor's in.
tent. Earl v. Peck, 64 N. Y. 596 (1876). McCarthy v. Pieret, 281 N. Y. 407,
24 N. E. 2d 102 (1939). If the intent is to confer an immediate, fixed right
upon the beneficiary, it is a valid contract, and the rules governing testamentary
dispositions will not apply. Matter of Tilley's Estate, 166 App. Div. 240, 151 N.
Y. Supp. 79 (3d Dept. 1915). Chase Nat'l. Bank v. Manufac. Trust Co., 265
App. Div. 406, 408, 39 N. Y. S. 2d 370 (1st Dept. 1943). Matter of Fairburn,
265 App. Div. 431, 433, 40 N. Y. S. 2d 280 (4th Dept. 1943). Therefore, the
fact that the "supplementary contract" in the instant case was held not to be one
of insurance does not, ipso facto, render it invalid. The plaintiff in the instant
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case acquired a fixed, "vested" right upon the formulation of the contract, since
the beneficiary could not add or change the contingent payees. Mutual Ben. Ins.
Co. v. Ellis, 125 F. 2d 127, 131 (2d Cir. 1942). In re Deyo's Estate, 180 Misc.
32, 42 N. Y. S. 2d 379, 388 (Surr. Ct. 1943). When such a present interest is
transferred, it is immaterial that its enjoyment be subject to postponement, condi-
tions, or complete defeasance (via the beneficiary's exercise of her right to
withdraw the principal sum). Ga Nun v. Palmer, 216 N. Y. 603, 609, 111 N. E.
223, 225 (1916). Matter of Tilley's Estate, supra. Chase Nat'l. Bank v. Mann fac.
Trust Co., supra. The payee, as a third-party beneficiary, may enforce the condi-
tional right, since the contingency has taken place. Mutual Ben. Ins. Co. v. Ellis,
supra. Glandziz et al., v. Callinicos, 48 F. Supp. 732, 733 (S. D. N. Y. 1942).
Restatement, Contracts, §134 (1932).
In the Ellis case, supra, the factual situation was almost identical with the
instant case, and the defendant raised the similar contention that the agreement
was invalid as an attempted testamentary disposition. As in the principal case,
the court ruled that no trust existed, and that the beneficiary's counter-offer had
resulted in a contract unconnected with one of insurance. Nevertheless, the court
held against defendant, and ruled that since plaintiff had acquired a fixed, vested
right upon the formulation of the contract, plaintiff was entitled to the proceeds
as a third-party donee-beneficiary, citing Seaver v. Ransom, 224 N. Y. 233, 120
N. E. 639 (1918). Accord: In re Koss' Estate, 106 N. J. Eq. 323, 150 At.
360 (1930).
Since, in the instant case, the right was vested in the plaintiff inter vivos, its
enjoyment contingent upon the death of the beneficiary, it is submitted that the
property did not pass by reason of the death, and thus did not violate the Statute
of Wills.
Robert Alan Thompson
CONFLICTS-STATUTE OF FRAUDS-SUBSTANCE OR PROCEDURE
Plaintiff brought an action in N. Y. for specific performance against the
executor of Harold Rubin and others to enforce an oral agreement by which the
decedent had agreed not to change his existing will. The agreement was made in
Florida, decedents domicile, and the contract was valid by Florida law. The
N. Y. Pets, Prop. Law Sec. 31(7) requires such contracts to be in writing. Held:
the Statute of Frauds is substantive as to cases involving conflicts of law, and
consequently does not preclude enforcement of a contract valid according to the
law of the place in which it was made unless it violates the forum's paramount
public policy. Rubin v. Irving Trust Co. et al., - Misc.- , 107 N. Y. S.
2d 847 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
